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a b s t r a c t
Objectives: This study describes a computer simulation model that has been developed to
explore organizational changes required to improve patient safety based on a medication
error reporting system.
Methods: Model parameters for the simulation model were estimated from data submitted
to the MEDMARX medication error reporting system from 570 healthcare facilities in the
U.S. The model’s results were validated with data from the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare
Initiative consisting of 44 hospitals in Pennsylvania that have adopted the MEDMARX medi-
cation error reporting system. The model was used to examine the effects of organizational
changes in response to the error reporting system. Four interventions were simulated involv-
ing the implementation of computerized physician order entry, decision support systems
and a clinical pharmacist on hospital rounds.
Conclusions: Results of the analysis indicate that improved patient safety requires more than
clinical initiatives and voluntary reporting of errors. Organizational change is essential for
significant improvements in patient safety. In order to be successful, these initiatives must
be designed and implemented through organizational support structures and institutional-
ized through enhanced education, training, and implementation of information technology
that improves work flow capabilities.
© 2006 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, To Err is Human: Build-
ing a Safer Health System [1], estimated that between 44,000 and
98,000 deaths occur in the U.S. each year as a result of medical
errors. In fact, there is evidence that morbidity and mortality
from prescription errors increased between 1983 and 1998 by
243% [2]. A significant number of these errors involve medi-
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cations. A meta-analysis of 39 prospective studies indicated
that adverse drug reactions may rank between the fourth and
seventh leading cause of deaths in the U.S. [3]. One study of
medication errors in 36 hospitals and skilled nursing facili-
ties in Georgia and Colorado found that 19% of the doses were
in error; 7% of the errors could have resulted in adverse drug
events [4]. Recognizing the magnitude of the medication error
problem, a subsequent IOM report, Crossing the Quality Chasm:
1386-5056/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2006.05.043
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A New Health System for the 21st Century [5] recommended that
confidential voluntary reporting systems be adopted in all
health care organizations. At present the Veteran’s Adminis-
tration, about half of the states, many hospitals and private
organizations have developed error reporting systems in an
effort to improve patient safety [6].
Traditionally, efforts to reduce errors have focused on train-
ing, rules and sanctions. Also, hospitals have relied on volun-
tary reporting of errors. Currently only 5–10% of medication
errors that result in harm to patients are reported [7]. As a
result little progress has been made since the IOM report 5
years ago [8].
1.1. Error reporting systems
The first step in reducing medication errors is standardized
reporting of the necessary data to understand the nature of
the problem. A number of reporting systems have been devel-
oped. Some of these systems are voluntary, others mandatory.
The most successful systems are modeled after the Aviation
Safety Report System (ASRS). This system is anonymous, vol-
untary and administered by the NASA for the Federal Avia-
tion Administration [9]. The Veterans Administration Patient
Safety Reporting System (PSRS) is patterned after the ASRS
system [10,11]. The Institute for Safe Medical Practice (ISMP)
also has developed a voluntary reporting system for medica-
tion errors [12]. Another system has been developed by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) called Data Watch for
the reporting of adverse events arising from medications and
medical devices [6].
Other reporting systems have been developed for ICUs [13],
at the Ohio State University Health Care System [14], and
for primary care clinics [15,16]. Some states in the U.S. have
mandatory medical error reporting databases. However, these
systems require the identification of the responsible parties
and are used for disciplinary actions [6]. Medical error report-
ing systems are also being implemented in other countries
such as Korea [17], Japan [18] and France [19].
In some instances error reporting systems are being imple-
mented among multiple institutions in order to share learn-
ing regarding incidence and types of errors and ways to
improve patient safety. For example, Johns Hopkins University
designed and implemented a Web-based ICU safety reporting
system in 18 ICUs across the United States [20]. The Pittsburgh
Regional Health Care Initiative is a consortium of 44 hospitals
that share data on nosocomial (hospital acquired) infections
and medication errors [21].
This study uses data from the MEDMARX system [22]. The
United States Pharmacopoeia (USP) introduced MEDMARX in
1998. It is an internet-accessible, anonymous medication error
reporting system. Currently 775 hospitals and health sys-
tems use the system. Medication errors are reported in a
standard format. A medication error is defined as “. . . any
preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate
medication use or patient harm while the medication is in
the control of the healthcare professional, patient, or con-
sumer. Such events may be related to professional practice;
healthcare practice; healthcare products’ procedures, and sys-
tems including prescribing; order communication; product
labeling; packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; dis-
pensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring
and use” [23].
1.2. Organizational actions
The majority of medical errors result from poorly designed
healthcare systems rather than from negligence on the part
of health care providers. Successful patient safety initiatives
require cognitive, social and organizational changes as well
as reporting [24,25]. Current health care systems are complex
and fragmented, involving interactions among a number of
health care professionals with various levels of education and
training [26]. The discontinuous nature of patient care fos-
ters errors [27]. Remedying the systemic problems that lead
to error will require organizational changes at the point of
care [28].
Members of the study team were associated with an Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) funded research
project. The purpose of the project is to achieve sustainable
improvements in health care on a regional basis by shar-
ing information. The objective of the project is to improve
patient care and safety in over 44 hospitals [21,26]. The hospi-
tals, working in a collaboration called the Pittsburgh Regional
Healthcare Initiative (PRHI), have been sharing information
about their medication errors for the past 3 years. The over-
all objective is to leverage the data from reporting to initiate
region-wide process improvements. The assumptions under-
lying this regional reporting system are described using a
learning chain model as shown in Fig. 1.
The framework suggests that the link between reporting
and learning requires that data about medication errors are
reported voluntarily by all classes of care providers (report-
ing system). The effectiveness of this system depends on
the quantity and quality of data reported. Quality in partic-
ular refers to data not just about serious errors that cause
patient errors but also about “near misses” that fail to reach
the patient. The latter kind of data enables organizations, in
principle, to proactively address root causes of errors in a
blame-free manner.
Data from the reporting system is disseminated to the
appropriate people in a timely manner (information-sharing
system). The effectiveness of this system depends on the pro-
portion of people involved directly/indirectly with medication
delivery who receive the information within a reasonable time
from the occurrence of errors. When a greater proportion of
people receive the information, awareness about the magni-
tude of the problem increases and, in turn, encourages further
reporting. This also increases the involvement of different
classes of providers in analyzing the data.
Information about errors is used by frontline care providers
to identify root causes and initiate corrective actions (problem
solving system). The effectiveness of this system depends on
the ability of care providers to diagnose underlying process
issues (in other words go beyond assigning individual blame
in identifying causes), design appropriate corrective actions,
and implement these actions. When data about errors results
in such process improvements, organizational learning is said
to occur.
A useful feature of the PRHI experiment is that the par-
ticipating hospitals implemented a standardized medication
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Fig. 1 – Learning chain.
error reporting system called MEDMARX. This database is
used by over 775 hospitals and health systems in the U.S.
and Canada. Because data is available about national trends
in reporting, it is possible to assess how the PRHI hospitals
fared relative to other hospital using this database. During
the past 3 years PRHI hospitals together reported over 17,000
medication errors, a number significantly higher than baseline
reporting levels nationally. Moreover, a greater proportion of
errors reported by these hospitals were “near misses”. In other
words, compared to other hospitals nation-wide that use the
MEDMARX system, PRHI hospitals reported a higher quantity
as well as quality of errors. But it remains less clear whether
this increase in reporting led to increased information-sharing
and problem solving and therefore to process improvements
that were directly traceable to voluntarily reported errors.
1.3. Limitations of current research
Despite a system-wide recognition that change must be
affected at all levels of healthcare, research to date on such
changes is plagued by two main issues. One, studies address-
ing the importance of voluntary reporting have lacked req-
uisite empirical support. It is still largely unclear as to how
the rates of voluntary errors change over time and what the
organizational or structural contributions to these longitudi-
nal effects might be. The present study examines fundamen-
tal questions regarding how organizations respond to reports
of medication error in hospitals, namely: Does the voluntary
nature of reporting encourage error documentation over time?
What types of errors are reported?
Two, research has focused mainly on the occurrence (e.g.,
an error was reported) and has not made an effective distinc-
tion between the types of medical errors. Those studies that
have attempted such a comparison have done so with largely
unstandardized data. Hayard and Hofer [29] underscore the
importance of definitional consensus, pointing out that fail-
ing to distinguish between error classifications and/or having
unstandardized definitions of what a “deadly” error is may
lead to inflated estimates of occurrence. This study overcomes
the deficits of previous research by utilizing standardized data
from multiple healthcare organizations.
Third although the importance of tracking medical errors
has been recognized, little research has focused on probing
the changes in the patterns of these errors over time. Simu-
lation permits the systematic study of stability and changes
over time and can thus provide critically needed evaluations
of the courses, causes and consequences of medical errors.
In this study we describe a computer simulation model
that can be used to explore organizational changes that are
required to improve patient safety based on a medication
error reporting system. The model is used to illustrate the fact
that patient safety initiatives require more than clinical ini-
tiatives. In order to be successful, these initiatives must be
designed and implemented through organizational support
structures and institutionalized through enhanced education,
training, and implementation of information technology that
improves work force capabilities [30,31]. For example, Brigham
and Women’s Hospital was able to reduce the adverse drug
event (ACE) rate in the intensive care unit (ICU) by two-thirds
by implementing information technology and by having clini-
cal pharmacists participate in patient care with the ICU team
[32].
However, information technology implemented to reduce
errors may have unintended consequences. One study of
the implementation of a computerized physician order entry
(CPOE) system in a hospital found that new errors were made
in order entry and had to be corrected by pharmacy staff to
prevent harm to patients [33]. A second study of a hospital
CPOE system found that the system actually facilitated the
risk of 22 types of medication errors [34]. Examples of errors
include fragmented computer displays of the patient’s medi-
cations, pharmacy inventory displays that were mistaken as
dosage guidelines, and inflexible ordering formats that facili-
tated double dosing and incompatible orders.
2. Methods
2.1. Data collection
In order to collect national standardized information on medi-
cation errors, the MEDMARX program was created to facilitate
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the collection of information essential to understanding the
causes of errors and the development of system-based solu-
tions. The program has been implemented by 775 hospitals
and health systems in the U.S. and Canada since 1998. Data
from the summary report for 1999–2003 were used to construct
the simulation model [22].
In an effort to determine whether hospitals working col-
lectively to report medical errors can improve patient safety, a
coalition was formed consisting of 44 hospitals. These hospi-
tals implemented a voluntary retrospective medication error
reporting system, the MEDMARX system. Data from these hos-
pitals were used to validate the model.
Table 1 shows the number and types of errors reported for
five quarters by the PRHI hospitals. Errors are classified as cir-
cumstances that have the potential to cause an error to occur
(category A); as errors that do not cause harm to the patient
(categories B–D); and as errors that result in harm to or the
death of a patient (categories E–I).
2.2. Simulation model
A computer simulation model was constructed in order to
model medication error reporting systems and organizational
changes needed to improve patient safety. STELLA was used
to create the model represented in Fig. 2. STELLA is a software
package based on the field of systems dynamics. The simu-
lation package permits investigators to apply concepts from
feedback control theory to social systems [35].
The model consists of two stages. In stage 1, medication
errors are generated based on a normal distribution of med-
Table 1 – Number and type of errors reported over time
by the coalition of hospitals
Type of error Number (%)
Category A: circumstances or events that have the
capacity to cause error
1189 (5.00)
Category B: an error occurred but the error did not
reach the patient
10793 (46.00)
Category C: an error occurred that reached the
patient but did not cause patient harm
9622 (41.00)
Category D: an error occurred that reached the
patient and required monitoring to confirm that it
resulted in no harm to the patient and/or required
intervention to preclude harm
1435 (6.10)
Category E: an error occurred that may have con-
tributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the
patient and required intervention
347 (1.50)
Category F: an error occurred that may have con-
tributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the
patient and required initial or prolonged hospi-
talization
60 (0.30)
Category G: an error occurred that may have con-
tributed to or resulted in permanent patient harm
6 (<0.001)
Category H: an error occurred that required inter-
vention necessary to sustain life.
12 (<0.001)
Category I: an error occurred that may have con-
tributed to or resulted in the patient’s death
2 (<0.001)
Total reported medication errors 16026 (100)
ication doses and medication errors. Errors are of two types:
errors that do not harm patients (categories A–D) and errors
that harm the patient (categories E–I). Reporting rates for each
type of error are assumed to increase over time according to
Fig. 2 – Hospital medication error reporting system.
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graphical functions. The rate of increase is based on summary
data reported through the MEDMARX system.
The second stage of the model generates actions taken
by the health care organization as a result of the reported
errors. According to the MEDMARX summary data, health care
organizations initiated interventions in response to reported
errors only 48% of the time. This rate was used in the model.
The organization can take two types of actions. The first type
of action that can be taken by a health care organization in
response to reported errors is individual interventions. These
interventions may involve informing the staff who made the
error, the patient’s physician and/or the patient who was
affected by the error. Staff education and training also may
be provided as a result of an error. These interventions do not
change the culture of the organization and may generally have
relatively little effect on future errors.
The second type of action involves system changes that
alter the organizational structure [36]. These actions include
modifying or implementing computer systems such as com-
puter physician order entry (CPOE) or implementing automatic
dispensing devices; modifying policies and/or staffing prac-
tices; and/or changing formularies. These actions may result
in substantial changes in the organizational culture and prac-
tices that may lead to greater patient safety. Examples include
computerized systems capable of detecting prescription errors
and potential and actual ADEs [37–39]. These systems utilize
rules to scan medication orders, laboratory results, etc. A list
of alerts concerning potential or actual ADEs is automatically
generated for care givers. Another example is the assignment
of clinical pharmacists to patient care teams [32].
Individual interventions are far more frequent, constitut-
ing 96% of the actions taken in response to reported errors
in the MEDMARX system. System interventions that signifi-
cantly changed the culture of the organization were taken in
only 4% of the cases where an action was taken in response to
a reported error. These intervention rates were incorporated
into the model.
The model also incorporates feedback. System interven-
tions can result in practice changes that alter the structure
and/or culture of the organization. Such changes can result in
fewer medical errors. Studies have demonstrated that organi-
zational interventions can significantly reduce serious medi-
cation errors. One study found that a CPOE system that was
introduced in a tertiary care hospital reduced medication
errors that either resulted in or had the potential to result in
ADEs by 55% [40]. A second intervention in which pharmacists
participated on physician rounds in an ICU found a decrease
of 66% in preventable ADEs due to prescribing errors [32].
At the same time high rates of ADEs may persist even after
the introduction of a computerized medical record. One study
found high rates of ADEs related to drug selection, dosage and
monitoring in a VA medical center after adoption of comput-
erized systems that had poorly designed data screens, drug
dosing details and minimal decision support rules [41]. Other
studies by Ash et al. [33] and Koppel et al. [34] have found that
CPOE can facilitate certain types of medication errors. Parame-
ters used in the model are shown in Table 2. These parameters
were derived from the literature and from the MEDMARX Fifth
Anniversary Data Report [22]. Several potential interventions
were simulated. First, the medication error reporting system
Table 2 – Model parameter estimates
Parameter Value
Medication doses per period Normal distribution M = 8000,
S.D. = 750
Medication error rate Normal distribution M = 0.19,
S.D. = 0.05
Error rate no harm 0.985
Error rate harm 0.015
Report rate 1 Graphical function of time
Report rate 2 Graphical function of time
Rate of overall organizational
interventions
0.48
Rate of individual interventions
(baseline)
0.96
Rate of systems interventions
(baseline)
0.04
Effect of system interventions on
error rates
Graphical function of time
System change multiplier Graphical function of time
was simulated under baseline conditions. The results were
validated against data reported by the 44 hospitals in Pennsyl-
vania. Next, intervention 1 examined the effects of introduc-
ing a basic computerized physician order entry system with
minimal decision support for the medication prescribing pro-
cess. Intervention 2 was performed assuming the implemen-
tation of a CPOE system with decision support. Intervention 3
assumed that a clinical pharmacist participated on physician
rounds and reviewed all medication orders written. Interven-
tion 4, assumed an organizational commitment to undertake
root-cause analyses and system changes to prevent future
errors from occurring.
3. Results
The model was used to simulate medication error reporting
in a typical hospital over 12 quarters. The model predicts the
number of medication errors reported by type and organiza-
tional actions taken as a result of reported errors. Fig. 3 shows
the results over the 12 quarters. As can be seen from the
graphs, the number of errors reported increased over time.
This suggests that, as a hospital gains experience with the
error reporting system, health care providers report a greater
proportion of errors that occur.
The model predicts that over 12 quarters a total of 1632
errors will be reported. Table 3 shows the predicted actions
taken by the hospital in response to reported errors. A total of
1632 errors were reported over the 12 quarters simulated by
the model. The baseline model predicts that only 2% of the
reported errors led to system changes to prevent future errors
from reoccurring.
In order to validate the model, the model predictions for
the first five quarters were compared to actual data from the
Pittsburgh regional coalition of 44 hospitals (see Table 4). Pre-
dicted values are quite close to the actual number of reported
errors.
Studies have indicated that system changes that involve
the implementation of information technology such as com-
puterized physician order entry (CPOE) or staff changes such
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Fig. 3 – Reported medication errors over 12 quarters.
as assigning clinical pharmacists to participate on physician
hospital rounds and review medication errors can reduce the
incidence of significant errors that could potentially harm
patients. Four interventions were simulated and compared to
Table 3 – Organizational actions in response to reported
errors


























the baseline simulation. The first organizational intervention
that was simulated assumed that a CPOE system with minimal
decision support capabilities was implemented in the hospi-
tal. The second intervention simulated the effect on serious
medication errors of implementing a CPOE system with deci-
sion support for drug selection, dosing and monitoring. A third
simulation examined the results of pharmacists’ participation
on physician rounds. The fourth simulation represented a sit-
uation where pharmacists participated on rounds as well as an
organizational commitment to identifying the causes of errors
and making system changes to improve patient safety. For
each of these simulations the graphical systems effect param-
eter was modified to reflect published studies that report the
effects of the intervention over time on medication errors. For
the fourth simulation a multiplier was introduced to reflect
organizational learning and a shift over time to root cause
analysis of errors and system changes to prevent them from
reoccurring. Results are shown in Table 5.
The first intervention simulated the implementation of a
CPOE system with minimal decision support. The intervention
failed to reduce serious medication errors. In fact, during five
quarters medication errors slightly increased over the base-
line.
The second intervention, introduction of a CPOE with deci-
sion support, resulted in a 21% reduction on average of serious
medication errors from 130 to 103 per quarter. The third inter-
vention involving the inclusion of a clinical pharmacist on
physician rounds had a larger effect on medication errors. The
model predicted a reduction of 27% in errors that could have
resulted in ADEs. Over the 12 quarters a total of 453 medication
errors could have been prevented by this intervention.
The final intervention that involves organizational learn-
ing based on the error reporting system and a commitment to
system changes to prevent future errors had the largest effect.
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Table 5 – Estimated number of serious medication errors that could have resulted in adverse drug effects by quarter
Quarter Baseline Intervention 1 Intervention 2 Intervention 3 Intervention 4
1 162 161 130 126 154
2 118 117 104 131 146
3 145 124 118 91 109
4 120 141 129 88 64
5 135 150 114 84 74
6 121 118 109 96 58
7 124 133 91 79 63
8 116 100 110 77 42
9 134 141 94 88 40
10 134 112 85 73 29
11 122 122 80 67 34
12 127 145 71 104 39
Total 1557 1566 1235 1104 852
Average 130 131 103 92 71
By the end of the 12 quarters the rate of serious medication
errors was reduced by almost 70% compared to the baseline.
Over the total period of time serious errors were reduced by
45%.
4. Discussion
This study describes a computer simulation model that
has been developed to explore the effects of organizational
changes in response to a medication error reporting system.
The model is based on the premise that successful patient
safety initiatives require more than reporting of errors. In
order to substantially reduce medication errors that have the
potential to harm patients, health care institutions need to
routinely share the information on errors with patients and
providers, identify root causes of the errors and initiate prob-
lem solving and system changes to prevent similar errors from
occurring in the future.
The model predicted that the number of medication errors
reported by hospital staff would increase over time. This find-
ing was corroborated by data from the Pittsburgh regional
coalition of hospitals. However, the baseline model con-
structed from summary data reported to the MEDMARX sys-
tem also indicated that organizational actions needed to
reduce the risk of future errors occurred less than 48% of the
time and found that 96% of the actions taken in response to
reported errors involved individual staff.
Several potential organizational system interventions were
simulated involving the introduction of a CPOE system and
pharmacist participation on physician rounds. The model pre-
dicted that the implementation of a basic CPOE system would
have little effect on the rate of serious medication errors over
12 quarters. The second and third interventions simulated
CPOE with decision support and pharmacist participation,
both resulted in a significant reduction of medication errors
that could harm patients. A fourth simulation assumed that
organizational learning occurred in the hospital as errors were
reported. Also, it assumed that a commitment was made to
increase system changes to prevent the same types of errors
from reoccurring in the future. The model predicted that in
this case the intervention would reduce the medication error
rate by almost 70% over time and prevent 705 serious errors
that could have harmed patients from occurring.
The study has several limitations. Error rates and reporting
rates were based on published studies. These rates vary con-
siderably from hospital to hospital and over time as an analysis
of reporting rates for the 44 hospitals in Pennsylvania indi-
cated. Also, the same analysis indicated that error reporting
rates increased over time. We tried to take this into account
by representing the medication error rate as a normal distri-
bution and error reporting rates in the model as a function of
time.
The CPOE interventions that were simulated also were
based on parameter estimates from published studies. How-
ever, CPOE systems vary considerably in the way they are
implemented. They may function largely as stand alone sys-
tems or interface with other systems (e.g., laboratory, phar-
macy, patient care). They may incorporate decision support
for prescribing, dosing, etc. As a result the effect of these inter-
ventions will vary greatly from hospital to hospital depending
upon the specific features of the CPOE system.
5. Conclusions
Individual mistakes alone are not the cause of medication
errors. Errors occur within an organizational context charac-
terized by a weak safety culture, inadequate operational prac-
tices and protocols, poor training and communication [25,42].
While error reporting systems and information technology
can partially correct some of these problems, they may not
completely solve them. The results of this study indicate that
a significant number of medication errors continued to occur
even after a medication error reporting system was imple-
mented in the hospital. Furthermore, simulation indicated
that adding information technology and changing rounds to
include a clinical pharmacist only reduced errors by 20–27%.
A significant reduction in medication errors only occurred
when the simulated hospital put into place a strategy of root
cause analysis when an error was reported and made system
changes to prevent this type of error from reoccurring in the
future. In this case the model predicted a reduction of almost
70% in the error rate over time.
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In conclusion organizational actions taken as a result of
errors indicate how aggressive the institution is in respond-
ing to reported errors. An effective patient safety program
facilitates reporting of errors and learning from these errors.
Organizational actions that only affect individual staff are
likely to have little effect in reducing future errors. Organiza-
tional or system changes could result in sustained changes in
the organizational culture and practices if implemented prop-
erly. These changes could lead to a significant improvement
in patient safety.
The results of this study suggest that there is a mismatch
between patient safety goals and hospital actions to reduce
the risk of future medication errors. Hospitals increasingly
seem to recognize the need to implement voluntary error
reporting systems in order to gather information needed to
reduce errors. At the same time, they fail to initiate organi-
zational changes that are needed to improve patient safety.
Typically hospital efforts are narrowly focused on communi-
cating information about errors to health care providers. More
than the implementation of voluntary reporting systems is
required. Significant reductions in errors will also require that
organizational changes, consistent with the improvement of
patient safety, be carefully institutionalized and integrated
into long-term plans.
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